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Our Legal Correspondent

CHENNAI, March 22

THE Madras High Court has held that workers who had worked during the closure of the Mettur-based Madras Aluminium Co Ltd from April 1, 1992 to October 1994 were eligible to be paid their wages irrespective of the settlement dated September 22, 1994 under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act).

Mr Justice D. Murugesan, who quashed the common order dated February 5, 1996 of the Labour Court, Salem, dismissing the claim petitions for wages of the petitioners, said that the settlement between the management and the workmen, in so far as it deprived the rights of the petitioners to their salary for the period in question would not be binding on the petitioners.

The fact that the Special Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Chennai, before whom the settlement was reached, had not applied his mind to the claim of the petitioners had been completely overlooked by the labour court.

"Such an order of the labour court, contrary to the well established principles of law, shall be termed only as `perverse' and is subject to interference by this court under Article 226 of the Constitution,'' the judge held.

The petitioners were all employed in the 2nd respondent factory (Malco), and the management asked all the workmen except those who were in-charge of essential services such as water supply and electricity not to report for duty on and from April 1, 1992.

The petitioners, who belonged to essential services, were required to report for duty, and they continued to work from April 1, 1992. The factory resumed normal operations in October 1994. The petitioners were not paid wages for the period April 1, 1992 to October 1994. They filed claim petitions before the 1st respondent (labour court).

The labour court had taken note of the settlement dated September 22, 1994 and dismissed all the claim petitions. Hence, the present writ petition.

On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that the settlement dated September 22, 1994 was not binding on the petitioners since the management had asked them to work even after April 1, 1992. The wages, which the petitioners had earned, were to be considered as property and the right to property could not be deprived except by due process of law under Article 300-A of the Constitution.

On behalf of the 2nd respondent, it was submitted that due to liquidity problems, the employees were notified that they were not required to report for duty from April 1, 1992. Though the petitioners were allowed to report for duty even from April 1, 1992 it was with a clear understanding that they were not entitled to salaries and wages in accordance with the previous terms and conditions of service and the emoluments for the period from April 1, 1992 till the company reopened would be on the basis of the rehabilitation scheme to be approved by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction.

Holding that the order of the labour court dismissing the claim petitions of the petitioners was illegal, the judge said that the claim of the petitioners was fully substantiated from the very notice issued by the 2nd respondent dated April 1, 1992.

The judge also referred to the argument of the 2nd respondent that the claims of the petitioners for salary were not due as per Clause 2 of the settlement dated September 22, 1994. Also, the validity of the settlement could be challenged only by way of writ petitions and the petitioners were not entitled to challenge the same before the labour court in a petition under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act since the settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of the Act was like an award and was binding on the workmen.

The judge observed that the evidence of the conciliation officer would go to show that the facts that the petitioners were directed to report for duty and they were assured of salary after the factory reopened.

In the said circumstance, the said officer could not have applied his mind to these facts before the settlement was arrived at between the 2nd respondent and the unions. Clause 2 of the settlement in so far as it deprived the rights of the petitioners to their salary for the period from April 1, 1992 would not be binding on the petitioners. The fact that the Special Deputy Commissioner of Labour had not applied his mind to the claim of the petitioners had been completely overlooked by the labour court.

The judge rejected the submission of the 2nd respondent that the settlement dated September 22, 1994 was binding on all the workmen, including the petitioners and the petitioners were pleading a new case before this court. In these circumstances, the common order passed by the 1st respondent/labour court was unsustainable and accordingly the same was thereby quashed. The petitioners were entitled to their salaries less the advance already paid to them during the period they worked. The writ petitions were allowed on the above said terms.

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