Afghanistan, a cauldron of chaos

American military interventions in recent times, whether in Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, Libya or Iraq, have undermined regional stability and left deep scars on the body politic of the affected countries. The society and body politic of the US itself has felt the tremors of these misadventures.

American military intervention in Afghanistan, code-named Operation Enduring Freedom, commenced in the aftermath of 9/11. Its combat role ended 13 years later, on December 31, 2014.

The Americans tried to win cheaply, outsourcing many operations to the erstwhile Northern Alliance.

This led to adversaries comprising the Mullah Omar-led Afghan Taliban, the Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden, and thousands of Islamic radicals from the Arab world, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China’s Xinjiang Province and ISI-linked Pakistani terrorist groups, escaping across the Durand Line, to safe havens under ISI protection, in Pakistan.

The US has paid a heavy price for this folly. Some 2,200 of its soldiers were killed in combat; it suffered its heaviest losses in the last four years after it became evident that it was pulling out.

As the US was winding down its military presence and transferring combat responsibilities to the Afghan National Army (ANA), an emboldened Taliban and its Chechen, Uzbek, Uighur and Turkmen allies have emerged from their Pakistani safe havens. In the subsequent fighting, 4,600 Afghan soldiers were killed in combat in 2014 alone. The Afghan army cannot, obviously, afford to sustain such heavy casualties continuously, if morale is to be sustained.

Trouble in northern Afghanistan

Apart from what is happening in southern Afghanistan, Taliban-affiliated groups are now increasing their activities in northern Afghanistan, along its borders with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China’s Xinjiang Province. Afghanistan’s Northern Provinces such as Kunduz, Faryab and Takhar, have seen increased attacks by Taliban allies from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

American forces are scheduled to be halved in 2015 and reduced to a token presence, just sufficient to protect American diplomatic missions, by the end of 2016. Not surprisingly, President Ashraf Ghani has asked the US to review its withdrawal schedule.

Afghanistan’s Southern Provinces, bordering the disputed Durand Line with Pakistan, are increasingly ungovernable.

Following General Raheel Shareef’s assault on Pashtun tribals in Pakistan’s tribal areas, over one million Pashtun tribals have fled their homes in Pakistan, with an estimated 250,000 fleeing into neighbouring Afghanistan.

If Mullah Omar, his Taliban associates and Sirajuddin Haqqani’s terrorist outfit are finding safe havens in Pakistan, Mullah Fazlullah and his followers in the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) appear to have disappeared into the wilderness, in Afghanistan.

Senator Kerry may issue a waiver on legislative requirements to enable the flow of aid to Pakistan. The reality however, is that even after the Peshawar massacre of schoolchildren, terrorist groups like the Haqqani network, the Jaish e Mohammed and the Lashkar e taiba receive safe haven and support in Pakistan.

Despite American hopes of a change of heart in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the reality is that Mullah Omar is still leading the Afghan Taliban from a safe house in Karachi.

The day-to-day conduct of operations in Afghanistan have reportedly been transferred by the ISI to one of his deputies, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour. Taliban attacks within Afghanistan reached unprecedented levels in 2014.

Moreover, while Washington proclaims that any process of reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan government will be “Afghan-led and Afghan-driven”, Rawalpindi will ensure that the entire ‘reconciliation’ process is controlled and driven by the ISI.

China, now endorsed by the US as the new Good Samaritan to facilitate the ‘reconciliation’, has maintained ISI-facilitated links with Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura. Beijing will naturally endorse the wishes of its all-weather friend Pakistan.

Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours who are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to which India was recently admitted, can expect little from this organisation to deal effectively with their concerns.

China has been now joined by Pakistan, as a member of the SCO. Given its growing economic woes and sanctions imposed by the US and its allies, Russia will have little choice but to fall in line with China, even though its special envoy Zamir Kabulov has expressed Moscow’s readiness to supply weapons to Kabul. Past Russian policy has been to supply weapons to Kabul on strictly commercial terms.

Adding to the prevailing uncertainty, is the fact that Afghanistan is today ruled not by the provisions of its constitution, but by a patchwork coalition of two formerly implacable political foes, President Ashraf Ghani and ‘Chief Executive’ Abdullah Abdullah.

The political gridlock in Kabul is tight. After the presidential elections, which were internationally regarded as neither free nor fair, the ruling duo, stitched together by Senator John Kerry, has been unable to agree even on the names of any new ministers. India obviously cannot countenance the return of an ISI-backed Taliban order in Afghanistan.

The US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement envisages the possibility of a US military presence “until the end of 2024 and beyond”.

Will it, however, be realistic to expect a war-weary US and its Nato partners -- now heavily focused on combating ISIL and similar radical groups across the Islamic World ranging from Iraq, Syria, Libya and Lebanon, to Somalia and Nigeria -- to continue to bail out a politically unstable Afghanistan?

Will the US and its allies provide the Kabul government with adequate air support, weapons and financial assistance, amounting to between $ 5-10 billion annually?

These are realities we cannot gloss over.

The security of our nationals and diplomatic missions in Afghanistan will require constant attention. Work on prestige projects such as the Salma Dam and the Afghan parliament will need to be expeditiously completed.

Cooperation with Iran on the Chabahar Port and establishing strategic connectivity to Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbours will have to be strengthened. Navigating on the road ahead is going to be tough.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan