Time to consolidate ties with Nepal

President Pranab Mukherjee paid a State visit to Nepal earlier this month. This was the first State visit to Nepal by an Indian Head of State after 18 years. The visit took place in the wake of significant political changes in Nepal. These included the resignation of Nepal’s India-baiting, China-centric, Maoist Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli.

President Mukherjee, who as external affairs minister was closely aware of the process of democratic transition in Nepal, was given a warm and ceremonial welcome. His visit enabled the two countries to have an exchange of views on virtually all issues of mutual interest.

The President’s visit came after a change in government in Nepal in August this year, with Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” being sworn in as Prime Minister, for his second term. Oli had resigned a month earlier. Bearing in mind India’s sensitivities, Prachanda chose, unlike his predecessor, to visit India, before heading for more distant capitals.

While India has contributed extensively to economic development in Nepal and to opening its higher educational institutions to Nepalese students, there is little to show by way of cooperation in harnessing the vast hydroelectric potential of 83,000 MW of Nepal, for mutual benefit. Unlike Bhutan, which has emerged as the most prosperous country in South Asia, because of the sale of electricity from hydroelectric projects constructed with Indian cooperation, Nepal has chosen to tie itself in knots thanks to glacial progress in hydel projects with India. These projects have the potential to significantly contribute to the well being of its people.

Even projects involving cooperation with private sector companies in India are now proceeding slowly. There is also much that needs to be done to improve grid connectivity between the two countries. This would enable Nepal to accelerate economic growth by obtaining power from India.

President Mukherjee’s visit came in the wake of a virtual stand-off between mainstream parties such as the Nepali Congress and Maoist/Communist parties on the one hand and those representing the “Madhesi” population on the other.

The Madhesis comprising Hindus, tribals and some Muslims, reside in 20 districts, covering 23.1 per cent of the total area of the country. They constitute 35.9 per cent of Nepal’s population. There are also significant differences between the Madhesi parties themselves, apart from their differences with their mainstream national counterparts.

Given that they reside in border areas contiguous to India and have familial ties across the open border, the Madhesi parties look to support from India to obtain what they aver are reasonable provisions in the constitution, which guarantee their due say, in the country’s governance.

We appear to be running into a situation in Nepal, akin to what prevailed in Sri Lanka in the early 1980s. Bringing the contesting parties together to reach an equitable solution to these ethnic differences, while making it clear that we will not countenance any challenge to the sovereignty, unity and integrity of Nepal, is going to remain the most daunting challenge for India’s diplomacy in Nepal. India has to ensure that any role it plays in Nepal is, tactful, discreet and not seen as being intrusive, or insensitive.

Pakistan continues to fish in troubled waters in Nepal, using it as a conduit to smuggle counterfeit Indian currency. It retains links with radicals like those involved in the hijacking of IC 814.

Given the cooperation India receives from Nepal, this issue can be contained. After the squeeze on smuggling counterfeit currency through Nepal and Bangladesh tightened, Pakistan is now trying to smuggle counterfeit currency through Thailand and Myanmar.

The real challenge India faces is from China, which is ready to use its diplomatic and financial muscle to erode Indian influence. China also seeks to ensure that disaffected Tibetans are not allowed shelter in Nepal, or given space to enter India from Nepal. India, in turn, is wary of any military cooperation between China and Nepal, or of any penetration of Chinese workers and projects into areas close to the Indo-Nepal border.

In more recent years, India has noted Chinese efforts at seeking to act as a protector of Buddhist beliefs, by expressing readiness to develop Lord Buddha’s birthplace Lumbini, located very close to the Indo-Nepal border. New Delhi boycotted the Oli Government’s efforts to organise a function in Lumbini in May this year, with Chinese assistance.

In the past few years China has indicated that it would invest over $3 billion to develop Lumbini, as a Buddhist heritage and academic site, linked by air and rail across Nepal and further to China. With a Buddhist population of over 250 million, China’s “Communist” rulers, some of whom are billionaires, naturally have to hedge against opposition to one Party rule assuming religious dimensions. Hence, the conscious effort by the ruling elite to appear “Buddhism friendly,” while hoping that it can benefit from schisms between those observing Mahayana, Theravada and Vajrayana practices!

Rather than merely opposing Chinese moves to exclusively develop Lumbini into a hub for tourism and Buddhist studies, India would be well advised to work with Nepal and countries with large Buddhist populations to develop a Buddhist tourism and heritage belt.

This could extend from Lumbini, to Buddhist historical and pilgrimage sites like Kapilavastu, Bodh Gaya, Sarnath, Sanchi and Kushinagar. It could be extended to other historical places like Varanasi.

Development of these tourist sites would require substantial investments on developing quality road and rail infrastructure and air services, apart from hotels and rest houses. But the tourism market for such services is huge, considering that there are an estimated 535 million practising Buddhists worldwide. China, Japan, Thailand, Myanmar Sri Lanka, Cambodia and South Korea have Buddhist populations of over 400 million.

Funds for building the Buddhist heritage tourism and a spiritual education in a corridor extending across Buddhist sites in India can easily be raised if India chooses to undertake a cooperative effort.

It can work with countries with large Buddhist populations, while seeking funds from institutions like the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank and private venture capital.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan