One of the few members of Congress President Sonia Gandhi’s darbar in Delhi who I befriended and genuinely got to like, during my time in government, was her speechwriter and spokesperson Janardhan Dwivedi. Affable and cultured, Dwivediji always sported a smile. A rarity among the nose-in-the-air, self-important darbaris of Delhi. Every now and then, we would meet over a lunch of tandoori pomfret at Delhi’s India International Centre. Our conversation was rarely about politics. But whenever politics entered the discussion, it became clear to me that DwiKvediji was a smart cookie. No wonder he was such a trusted and valued aide of the party president. So, I’d take whatever Dwivediji says seriously.
In a rare interview last week, he said that the Congress Party should not have formed the government in 2009 and instead, ought to have sat in the opposition. What he did not mention was that this may well have been the party’s original strategy in 2009. At least many political analysts thought so. The Congress never expected to improve upon its tally of 2004 and assumed it would be required to sit in the opposition. Unfortunately, for the party’s grand strategists, the people of India — especially in Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and a couple of other States — voted so handsomely for the Congress that it had no option but to form a government.
Consider the facts. In the run up to the polls in 2009 the Congress party had convinced itself that the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had disappointed the party’s rank and file and its traditional support base, especially the Muslims. The decision to jettison the Left Front, the decision not to declare Telangana a separate State and, above all, the decision to conclude the civil nuclear energy agreement with the United States were all seen as political mistakes that would cost the Congress dearly. Then there was inflation and the handling of the terror attack in Mumbai.
Not to worry, said the party’s strategists, if we lose the elections as a result of all these costly mistakes, we will blame it on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and sit in the opposition. Rahul Gandhi would then become leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha. This would enable Rahul Gandhi to emerge a national leader in his own right, stepping away from his mother’s
Remember that Sonia Gandhi suddenly took a decision, virtually on the eve of the poll in 2009, to place Dr Singh’s face on the cover of the party manifesto and declare him the party’s prime ministerial candidate. The game seemed clear. When the results are in, blame Dr Singh for the defeat, anoint Rahul the leader and move on. Unfortunately, for the strategists who assumed the Congress would fare poorly, the voter in a clutch of States and across urban India decided to reward Dr Singh and his government handsomely. The Congress saw its tally, at 206 seats, rise to a level that it had not seen since 1991.
When the results came in there was a scramble in the party to claim credit for the performance, rather than the kind of wise self-effacement that Dwivedi’s remarks now suggest. Enveloped by such euphoria no one in the Congress Party was thinking long-term, as Dwivedi now wishes they had. In 2004, the Congress was stunned by the opportunity that presented itself and chose to form a government. By 2009 it was so comfortably ensconced in office that everyone, perhaps with the exception of Dwivediji, was happy to be back in office.
The issue at hand was not whether or not the Congress would form a government, but who should be given credit for the party’s improved performance. Every party leader was happy to go on TV and claim that the credit should go to Rahul Gandhi. When asked for his comment on the result, the minister of State in the PMO Prithviraj Chavan told a news channel the ‘mandate was for Rahul Gandhi’. He was later rewarded with a chief ministership!
In Andhra Pradesh, the late YS Rajasekhara Reddy and his supporters claimed the party’s improved tally in the State was a reward for his leadership and keeping the State united. Sitting alone at home, Dr Singh thought the mandate was his. Soon he was disabused of any such illusions. Uncertainty about the parentage of the victory was the mother of UPA-2’s woes rather than the decision to keep the coalition marriage going.
In 2014, Dwivedi’s 2009 strategy may well play out. The Congress Party will blame Dr Singh and his government for the defeat, and Rahul Gandhi will build his brand as leader of opposition. Or so some hope.
(Sanjaya Baru’s book The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh will be published later this year)