Engaging with Pakistan diplomatically is more in our interests than Pakistan’s, says Srinath Raghavan, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research. On a recent visit to Chennai as Visiting Fellow to the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Raghavan spoke to BusinessLine on a variety of issues in the strategic and diplomatic realm. Excerpts:

What are your thoughts on the ‘surgical strikes’ against Pakistan, and the optics of the Centre’s handling of the matter?

Surgical strikes have happened in the past, too; the key difference this time is that the government has spoken about it openly. In a sense, there is a fundamental paradox on how we want to use force to deal with terrorism emanating from Pakistan. If you use force in ways that will significantly hurt them, it will likely lead to an escalation, which you don’t want.

Doing something on a smaller scale will send out a tactical message: that we won’t put up with this stuff. The DGMO statement announcing the surgical strikes, which is the only authentic source of information, says there are no plans for further strikes, which means the government doesn’t want to escalate the situation.

In strategic terms, what has India gained from the surgical strikes?

The gains are two-fold. One is that the government is sending out a message to Pakistan that we will not sit tight and do nothing.

Second, it served to tell the domestic audience that this government is in control of the situation, which is also very important. At the end of the day, the government doesn’t want the domestic audience to swing wildly from one position to the other.

But the basic conundrum still exists, as the use of force only has limited utility in dealing with Pakistan. Surgical strikes have to be a part of a larger plan; to be fair, the government is looking at it that way: it is trying to isolate Pakistan diplomatically. But surgical strikes will work only if they are part of a larger diplomatic and strategic policy; they cannot work in isolation.

Have the diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan really gained traction?

What does diplomatic isolation mean? Does it simply mean totting up joint statements with other countries condemning terrorism emanating from Pakistan? The Centre needs to think beyond joint statements and think of consequences and outcomes on the ground.

And if the Centre wants to put serious pressure on Pakistan, it has to tackle two countries: the US and China. Both these countries see Pakistan as an ally despite the serious differences they may have with it. So, as long as China is shielding Pakistan, it will be very difficult for any Indian strategy to work. We have a special relationship with the US, but what has that got us in terms of Pakistan? Very little.

But isn’t it true that the US- Pakistan is at best opportunistic?

Yes, but that’s been the case for the last 50 years: that’s as permanent as it gets! In fact, the US-Pakistan relationship precedes the Pakistan-China relationship.

The US constantly says it is fed up of Pakistan, but that makes very little difference on the ground. Today, the US Congress has a very strong anti-Pakistan views, but will that survive when the next US President takes over? I’m more or less sure it will not. The first thing the next US President will want to do is to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan also greatly benefits from its geo-strategic location.

In dealing with Pakistan, will ‘backdoor diplomacy’ be a better option as it would strengthen the democratic forces there vis-a-vis the army and the ISI?

The basic problem for India over the last 15-16 years in dealing with Pakistan is that we have not figured out the relationship between diplomacy and terrorism.

We have always assumed that cutting off diplomatic links with Pakistan is the best way to put pressure on it on the terrorism front. But if you look at the record, whether or not we’re dealing with Pakistan diplomatically, terrorism is happening, so I don’t believe there is a link between these two. Diplomatic links with Pakistan have their advantages in other aspects, and one must not always look at them through the prism of terrorism.

So I believe there is a case for diplomacy with Pakistan, which should be continued, but it should be calibrated depending on how Pakistan behaves.

On the other point, it is very difficult to sit in India and gauge the balance of power in Pakistan and the nature of the relationship is between the civilian administration and the army. In any case, democracy in Pakistan should not be because of India’s benevolence.

Both the civilian and military in Pakistan come from the same elite. They share the same views on dealing with India. There are others, like businessmen, in Pakistan who also come from the same elite who, from time to time, seek better relations with India, but they don’t have much say in policy-making.

But over the last two years, relations between India and Pakistan have swung from one end of the pendulum to the other. But in the end, engaging with Pakistan is more in India’s interests than Pakistan’s.

That’s because the two countries want very different things. India is looking for 9-10 per cent economic growth so it wants stability on the political front.

But Pakistan has a more cynical view: the society there has come to accept that there are terror elements embedded in their system. It is up to India to take the initiative and resume talks and I’m sure that’s what’s going to happen few months from now.

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