An icy feel to Indo-Russian ties

Vladimir Putin will spend less than 24 hours in New Delhi when he visits India for the 11th time for the Indo-Russian Annual Summit. He is neither going to address the Indian Parliament, nor will he visit the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant despite Prime Minister Modi’s invitation.

To be sure, at the official level everything seems fine. The two leaders are going to unveil “vision documents” to add to over hundreds of agreements already signed so far --- which actually only exist on paper. Two-way interactions have fallen. Annual trade turnover, targeted to achieve $20 billion by 2015, still hovers around $10 billion. The reasons are well known, but steps to bridge the gaps are not in evidence.

Tangible actions may include implementation of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), through Nhava Sheva via Bandar Abbas to Astarkan, and a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between India and the Customs Union (CU) of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

Both projects are problematic; doing business through Iranian port is neither easy, nor is the CU a happy economic union. Rosneft’s offer of two Siberian oilfields in Vankor and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye is a significant development, but how OVL will finally take it forward remains a question. It may face stiff competition from China’s CNPC.

A significant item that may stamp the visit will be a business deal between India’s Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council (GJEPC) and the world’s largest diamond mining company, Alrosa of Russia, for sourcing rough diamonds directly for the diamond processing industry in India. Modi-Putin could possibly make a joint appearance at the World Diamond Congress in New Delhi.

Putin’s visit, however, comes at a time of growing uneasiness in the Indo-Russian relationship. With Russia facing tough international sanctions over Moscow’s standoff with Ukraine, India is unable to help its old friend much, except for taking an ambiguous diplomatic position.

In contrast, China, through a series of big energy deals, is helping Russia ease its economic isolation --- significantly offsetting Russia’s reliance on the European market.

Russia is hugely upset with India’s procurement policy, and unable to digest the US overtaking it as a weapons supplier to India. Many in Moscow are sulking, seeking retribution by ending the arms blockade to Pakistan. A chorus of voices has emerged in the Russian media, saying ‘whom does India stand for — the US or Russia?’

Russia’s decision to forge defence cooperation with Islamabad is not going down well in New Delhi. In a veiled signal, Putin sent his Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu to Islamabad weeks before his scheduled visit to New Delhi.

Shoigu promised to translate the Defence Cooperation Agreement into a tangible politico-military understanding, which would include regional security matters. He praised the expertise of Pakistani Armed Forces and said “The world community wants to do business with Pakistan now”.

Of course, courting Islamabad is linked to Moscow’s current international isolation, but it has already sold MI-35 Hind helicopters to Pakistan. The Russian appetite for arms trade with Pakistan could only grow.

Moreover, Russia now sees Pakistan as an important determinant in Afghanistan. Russia’s position however may no longer be identical to India’s. It may go for a more nuanced approach situated somewhere between Indian and Pakistani Afghan policy. The shift of stance could impact regional issues, including Kashmir.

In 2000, Putin told Parliament “the same forces that were creating problems in J&K were behind problems in Chechnya.” This time, Putin has cancelled his address to Parliament citing a busy schedule. Russians are experienced hands at playing around with regional geopolitics. By supporting the entry of India and Pakistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Moscow may be contemplating a bigger game.

In India, sceptics question the relevance of the history of Indo-Russian ties. The two countries have substantially moved away from each other, as can be seen from divergent pursuits in their foreign and defence policies.

The ‘buyer-seller’ defence transactions are threatened by global competitiveness. India’s disappointment stems from Russian failure to meet delivery schedules, as a result jacking up costs. Besides, there has been a reluctance from the Russian side to transfer technology and supply of unreliable spares. The late delivery of INS Vikramaditya was a case in point.

The story may be repeated over commencement of the stealth Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) and the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MTA). As it stands, it may take years before production begins.

The question is whether Putin and Modi can straighten the loose ends of existing defence and civil nuclear cooperation projects. Instead of feeling slighted, Russia should update the scope of cooperation.

Surely Russia would be worried about Modi’s ‘Make in India’ campaign and the proposed Indo-US Defence Trade and Technical Initiatives (DTTI). These moves could free India from import dependency while seeking co-production and co-development with the US in several big-ticket items that are aimed at boosting the Indian economy and security apparatus.

‘Make in India’ hopes to create jobs and make India a competitive exporter.

Clearly, behind Modi’s overt message is the suggestion that Russia is unable to satisfy the growing ‘Make in India’ demand. Russia is using energy as a powerful weapon to counter sanctions by the West.

For New Delhi, only a blockbuster deal – such as laying of a proposed $40 billion long-distance oil and gas pipeline from Russia to India -- can revolutionise trade prospects to touch over $100 billion. Energy diplomacy can replace the waning defence business and reintroduce a sense of balance in Indo-Russian relations.

However, a strategic partnership with Russia cannot be wished away. A country with large stockpiles of strategic bombers and a veto power in the UNSC acts as a useful counterweight against global hegemony. Here, India needs to be mindful about the risks of relying totally on the US in strategic and economic terms, for it could restrict access to civil-military technologies.

New Delhi also cannot ignore geostrategic calculations. Russia’s diplomatic support to India in the context of Kashmir cannot be lost sight of, especially when the traditionally strong US-Pakistan relationship and China-Pakistan nexus still persists.

The writer is a former ambassador and an expert on Eurasia