Neither the RBI Act nor any rules lay down a formal accountability mechanism. In the absence of a specific formulation, the fallback is on the general principle underlying a democracy — which is to render accountability to Parliament through the Finance Minister. As regards autonomy, the Reserve Bank has not been accorded autonomy under the statute. The RBI Act lays down that the Central Government may give directions to the Bank, from time to time, after consultation with the Governor, where considered necessary in public interest.
POLICY FORMULATION
The reality, however, is quite different. RBI in effect functions with a functionally autonomous mandate and there has been no instance so far of the Government exercising its reserve powers to issue a directive. Since we are not an inflation targeting central bank, there is no formal memorandum of understanding (MOU) or a ‘Results Agreement' between the Government and the Reserve Bank. Nevertheless, we render accountability for our performance on inflation. We explain the rationale for our monetary policy stance quite extensively.
For most of the other important, non-monetary policy decisions, it has now become standard practice for the Reserve Bank to consult with stakeholders and call for feedback on the draft policy before a final decision is taken.
COMMITTEE-BASED APPROACH
Monetary policy decisions are made by the Governor. There is no formal committee structure like the FOMC of the Fed or the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. The Governor holds structured consultations with the four Deputy Governors and they constitute an informal MPC although a committee structure is not enjoined under the law or the rules. By its very nature there is no voting in this committee and the final call is that of the Governor.
Ahead of each quarterly monetary policy announcement, there is also an extensive process of structured consultation by the Governor with banks, financial market representatives, trade bodies and industry associations. We also convene a meeting of economists and analysts twice a year, ahead of the annual policy in April and the second quarter policy in October.
Finally, close to the policy decision, an established practice for the Governor is to meet the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister informally, give them an assessment of the macroeconomic situation and indicate to them his proposed policy stance. This is only a matter of courtesy, and the process has not impinged on the autonomy of the Reserve Bank in monetary policy making.
The consultation with the Finance Minister, in particular, should be seen as an avenue for fiscal-monetary coordination. An issue that comes up often is that even as the current system is working, whether we might be better served by having a formal MPC with its majority advice becoming binding. My own view is that we should be moving towards an MPC system, but in a phased manner. There are some pre-conditions to be met.
First, the central bank should be given legally-backed formal autonomy. Second, in a situation where inflation dynamics are more often dictated by supply side elements, the central bank's ability to control inflation is restricted.
An MPC mechanism in such a situation can weaken the coordination between the Government and the Reserve Bank. However, when our financial markets deepen further, operating procedures improve and monetary transmission becomes more efficient, shifting to an MPC system becomes a realistic option.
INFLATION TARGETING
The RBI is not an inflation targeting central bank. Nevertheless there is an influential view that our economy will be better served if the Reserve Bank becomes one.
The argument is that inflation hurts much more in a country like India with hundreds of millions of poor people and that the RBI will be more effective in combating inflation if it is not burdened with other objectives.
This argument is contestable. Inflation targeting is neither feasible nor advisable in India, and for several reasons. First, in an emerging economy like ours, it is not practical for the central bank to focus exclusively on inflation oblivious of the larger development context. The Reserve Bank cannot escape from the difficult challenge of weighing the growth-inflation trade off in determining its monetary policy stance.
Second, the drivers of inflation in India often emanate from the supply side which are normally beyond the pale of monetary policy. In particular, given the low income levels, food items have a relatively larger weight in the consumption basket in India compared to advanced economies and even many emerging market economies.
We have three consumer price indices each covering different segments of the population with the weight for food ranging between 46-70 per cent.
Monetary policy, as is well known, is an ineffective instrument for reining in inflation emanating from supply pressures. It is unrealistic, under these circumstances, to expect the Reserve Bank to deliver on an inflation target in the short-term.
An alternative put forward is that we could target core inflation rather than headline inflation. That is not a feasible solution either. An inflation index, with half the basket excluded from it, hardly reflects reality.
Moreover, the exclusion of food from the core index can be justified if average food inflation is the same as the average non-food inflation. If food inflation is higher, as is typically the case in many low income countries including India, then we would be underestimating inflationary pressures on a systemic basis. That would mislead policy prescriptions.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we settle on inflation targeting, we have a problem about which inflation index to target. The headline inflation index is the wholesale price index (WPI), and that does not, by definition, reflect the consumer price situation. However, getting a single representative inflation rate for a large economy with 1.2 billion people, fragmented markets and diverse geography is a formidable challenge.
Finally, a necessary condition for inflation targeting to work is efficient monetary transmission. There are several factors inhibiting the transmission process such as an asymmetric relationship between depositors and banks, administered interest rates on postal savings that are not adjusted in line with prevailing interest rate trends and rigidities in the financial markets. All these factors dampen the efficacy of monetary signals and complicate the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in India.
Excerpts from a lecture by the RBI Governor, Dr Duvvuri Subbarao, at the meeting of the Central Bank Governance Group in Basel on May 9.
(To be concluded)