BOOK EXTRACT. The Bose effect in Singapore

From July 1943 to the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Subhas Chandra Bose — the renowned Indian nationalist leader and two-time President of the Indian National Congress — took charge of the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia. In historical works and popular memory, this period has been recognized as the zenith of Indian nationalist fervour amongst Indians in Singapore. The sense of mission to free India from colonial rule galvanized a hitherto unseen level of pan-Indian unity in the diaspora. Under Subhas’ leadership, tens of thousands of Indians in Singapore were directly engaged in the struggle to free India from British rule. Young civilians flocked to join the Indian National Army, and many came to be deployed on the Burma-India frontline. The INA campaign ultimately proved a military failure, but for many who were involved, the experience is remembered as a heroic chapter in the history of the Indian diaspora in Singapore.

Historical works on the Indian diaspora in Singapore during this period have focused primarily on the development of the INA, and especially Subhas’ role in the making of a revolutionary force. While these elements comprise important components of the Indian experience, the ‘voices’ of subalterns affected by these developments has received less attention. Their testimonies suggest that while many were indeed imbued with a sense of mission to free India from British rule, there were also some who saw the demands imposed on them as excessive, and felt that the pan-Indian unity that was fostered was not necessarily the outcome of a genuine transformation in consciousness but rather forced upon. While a key concern is to understand the reasons why so many Indian civilians in the diaspora joined the Movement at this time, the study is attentive to the limitations of the Movement’s appeal, especially from mid-1944 onwards, as news of the military failure of the INA began to spread.

Indeed, these two years arguably coincided with the most difficult phase of the Japanese Occupation. Economic conditions deteriorated rapidly. Like other ethnic groups in Singapore, Indians were affected by scarcity, malnutrition, and shortages of medical supplies that collectively led to a rapid increase in mortality rates in the port city. Simultaneously, large numbers of Indians were compelled to work on Japanese projects like the infamous Thai-Burma ‘Death’ Railway from which many did not return. Relocation schemes put in place to cope with food scarcity in the city also resulted in some Indians being ‘encouraged’ to migrate to new settlements where conditions proved arduous. Collectively the Indian experience during this watershed period left a deep imprint, with longer term implications on the socio-political development of the diaspora in the port city.

On 2 July 1943, an exuberant crowd welcomed Subhas Chandra Bose (commonly referred to by the honorific ‘Netaji’) at the Kallang aerodrome in Singapore. Two days later, Indian Independence League (IIL) delegates, INA and Japanese officers gathered at the Greater East Asia Theater to witness the formal handover of control of the Movement from Rash Behari Bose to Netaji. In accepting charge, Subhas delivered the first of his many awe-inspiring speeches in Singapore — announcing plans to set up a Provisional Government of Free India . In the weeks that followed, Netaji worked at an extraordinary pace to put in place measures necessary for the formation of the Provisional Government. His residence in Singapore — a seafront villa at 61 Meyer Road 2 — was constantly ‘besieged by callers’ including Japanese and INA officers, IIL leaders, prominent Indian civilians, and ‘hundreds of others who came only for a “darshan” of the great leader’.

Subhas’ first task was to lift morale in the INA force. On 5 July, he reviewed INA troops at the Padang where he delivered the famous Dilli Chalo! (Onwards to Delhi!) address. Observer accounts suggest that the effect of Netaji’s arrival on the 13,000-strong force was instantaneous. Lieutenant-Colonel Sahgal — who later assumed the position of Assistant Chief of Staff and Military Secretary of the INA — noted a distinct change amongst soldiers: “A large number of people went out of the INA with Mohan Singh. And morale was naturally low. When Subhas came, the whole thing changed.... Subhas Chandra Bose was a known Indian national leader.... Everybody felt he would be [more] acceptable to the people of India than Mohan Singh.... The coming of Subhas Chandra Bose completely revolutionised,... the whole movement because people had great confidence [in him]...”

The following day, the INA was on parade again, this time reviewed by the Japanese Prime Minister. Tojo, impressed by the display, was said to have granted immediate approval for ‘the establishment of [a] ... provisional government [of Free India]’. The Japanese Prime Minister’s presence was a clear indication of support for Subhas’ leadership. Additionally, it underlined Netaji’s reach in Japanese political circles, which had the effect of limiting Japanese interference in the development of the Movement.

Attempts were made to enlist Indian POWs who had withdrawn from the INA after December 1942. This proved difficult. Only 2,000 more joined. Recruitment was limited by the fact that a substantial proportion of the POWs had, by this time, been transported to Japanese-controlled territories outside Singapore for forced labour. Subhas’ appeals for the return of those who had been dispatched was refused by the Hikari Kikan — the Japanese liaison agency that had replaced the Iwakuro Kikan. The limitations of the POW recruitment drive meant that the prospects of building a sizeable INA force now rested heavily on mobilizing civilian volunteers.

The wave of enthusiasm in civilian circles following Subhas’ takeover offered hope. More than 60,000 Indians attended Netaji’s first public address at the Padang on 9 July 1943. On that occasion he underscored that the success of an INA attack on Indian soil depended on the ‘total mobilization’ of manpower and resources of the Indians in Southeast and East Asia. By ‘total mobilization’ he meant drawing all segments of Indian society in the support of the League’s activities, and to build an army that he envisaged would over time be 300,000-strong. Able-bodied men and women were encouraged to volunteer for the INA — the latter for the newly created Rani of Jhansi Regiment. Boys and girls under the age of 18 could enlist at the Junior Cadet Schools, the Balak Sena and the Balika Sena — preparatory institutions for the INA that provided basic military, drill, language, and ideological training to boys and girls. Others still could serve in IIL departments. Subhas underlined the need for the Movement to be financially independent and demanded that the Indian population in East and Southeast Asia provide generous monetary assistance for the purpose. Observer accounts of the rally on 9 July 1943 suggest that the audience was clearly inspired.

With permission from Oxford University Press