Addressing Russian President Vladimir Putin and the media last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said “the character of global politics and international relations is changing. However, the importance of this relationship and its unique place in India’s foreign policy will not change.”
Expressed on the sidelines of the 15th Annual India-Russia Summit in New Delhi, Modi’s statement conveyed his intention to enhance cooperation with Russia. Concurrently, it also implied India will not support western sanctions against Russia. The new government’s policy of engagement is very much in line with the UPA’s stance. However, like Manmohan Singh, Modi has refrained from speaking on the issue of sanctions.
In the absence of official explanations, one can only wonder what explains India’s positions on unilateral sanctions.
Subsequently, in March this year, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea invited western sanctions, UPA was quick to express its disregard for the “unilateral measures.”
Though the prime minister chose not to speak on the issue, the official position maintained was that India has “never supported unilateral sanctions against any country... therefore, will also not support any unilateral measures by a country or a group of countries.”
The Modi government is also toeing the line on cooperation with Russia in spite of sanctions. Since becoming Prime Minister, Modi has, time and again, underlined his intent to not only maintain ties with Russia but substantially enhance them.
As the Russian episode unfolds and India maintains its stand on sanctions, it is worthwhile to study India’s position on unilateral sanctions over the years and its motivations for supporting or opposing unilateral sanctions.
We too faced it The first factor is its experience as a sanctionee. India has been sanctioned or threatened by sanctions several times. Responding to India’s first nuclear test (Pokhran I) conducted in 1974, several western countries imposed nuclear equipment and material embargo on India.
In the 1990s, sanctions were imposed on India’s civilian space programme, given the potential for cryogenic rocket technology to contribute to India’s ballistic missile capability.
The Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) sanctioned the country in 1992, barring it from engaging in nuclear commerce. The most widely known and discussed unilateral sanctions against India were placed by the US after India’s second nuclear tests (Pokhran II) in May 1998.
The sanctions were imposed under section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and included prohibitions on foreign assistance, weapons sales and licenses, foreign military financing, government credit, guarantees and export of certain controlled goods and technology.
Some non-statutory sanctions restricting high-level visits and military-to-military contacts were also imposed in accordance with President Clinton’s administration policy.
While the intended effect of sanctions was mostly meant to be material in nature, they also had a psychological impact. A generation of Indian leaders and bureaucrats began to perceive sanctions as a tool of deliberate denial rather than an instrument to change the behaviour of the sanctioned entity. This perception towards sanctions is still observable in India’s policy-making circles.
National interest India’s national interest is the second factor that has played a role in determining its reaction to unilateral sanctions. Supporting unilateral sanctions placed on countries with which it shares good relations or commercial ties has never been an easy decision for New Delhi.
Considering that in the past few decades, many of the countries under international sanctions have been India’s trade partners, its leadership has often kept interests in mind while deciding on their stand on sanctions.
Myanmar is an important case in this regard. While the US imposed stringent sanctions on Myanmar throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, renewing them in 2010, the Indian government chose to maintain a safe distance from the U.S.-led sanctions regime. Although sanctions were imposed to promote democracy in Myanmar — a goal not averse to India — it was not about the salience of the issue for the country.
The third factor is India’s willingness or unwillingness to support the cause of sanctions. New Delhi has stood by sanctions that are imposed to support issues it believes in. Sanctions imposed to promote democracy have not managed to strike a chord with the Indian government. However, sanctions placed to protest discrimination, especially against the Indian diaspora, have garnered support from New Delhi.
In the 1940s, India became the first country to impose sanctions on South Africa to protest against apartheid. In addition to the action, it also supported unilateral sanctions on the South African government, convincing countries, as well as international organisations, to follow suit.
Subsequently, in the late 1980s, India imposed sanctions to protest against discrimination of people of Indian origin in Fiji. Sri Lanka is a recent case where a pro-sanctions public opinion seems to be emerging to protest discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka.
Sanctions were an important subject for Jawaharlal Nehru, the original architect of Indian foreign policy.
He discussed this instrument of statecraft as early as in 1938 while explaining the Congress’s attitude towards collective security. He said that for any system of collective security to be successful, it had to be backed by sanctions. However, lately the Indian leadership has been reticent about the topic.
Meanwhile, it cannot be ignored that on certain occasions, New Delhi has had to learn to adapt to unilateral sanctions. Iran is an important case in this regard. Though India was against unilateral sanctions placed on Iran, it could not overlook secondary sanctions which were a part of the US-led sanctions regime.
Though in principle, India supports UN sanctions and has supported important UN sanctions like the ones placed on North Korea, there have been some departures. In 1990, India had opposed UN sanctions against Iraq and abstained from voting in 1992 when UN Security Council wanted to sanction Libya.
Domestic reasons as well as normative considerations have played a primary role in determining India’s response to unilateral sanctions. Domestically, India’s past experience with sanctions and national interests have been imperative. Normative concerns arising from sensitivity to particular issues have also determined India’s position.
India has also used sanctions to forward its domestic and foreign policy objectives, though it remains to be seen what kind of considerations determine its stance on sanctions as the country gains influence in world politics.
The writer is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi. This article is by special arrangement with the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania