Bhopal gas tragedy, and lessons not learnt

India needs an effective safety case regulatory regime. There are over 1,900 major accident hazard (MAH) control units or facilities in India. There are also thousands of registered hazardous factories below MAH criteria.

There are numerous factories in unorganised sectors storing and handling hazardous chemicals, posing serious and complex risks to people, property and the environment. Major chemical and petrochemical disasters, killing many, have occurred almost every year since the 1984 Bhopal gas leak disaster.

In addition to the loss of lives, these disasters have eroded the manufactured, human and natural capital base of the Indian economy. Adverse impacts to the banking and finance sector are also significant.

For example, insurers and underwriters can potentially become insolvent if disasters of the scale of the Bhopal gas leak were to occur.

India should formulate and implement a comprehensive safety case legislative framework. At present, various elements of safety are dispersed in various Rules that have become antiquated, when compared to current industry best practice and community expectations.

India should consolidate the intent and the principles underpinning various Acts and Rules relevant to MAH control units, and develop a self-contained and an integrated legislative framework.

There are also Acts and Rules promulgated by the Petroleum and Explosive Safety Organisation (PESO) and the Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) that lie outside the realm of MAH Rules.

There is a need to bring together the best elements from these Acts and Rules to develop a cohesive regulatory framework.

The MAH control rules do not explicitly consider safety management systems, while major accidents that have been occurring invariably point towards systemic failures at the facilities.

Neither the current regulation nor the industry codes of practice provide sufficient clarity on risk tolerance criteria.

It is absolutely essential that MAH control units should define individual and cumulative risk tolerance criteria for on-site and off-site fatality and serious injuries, and evaluate the facility risks against these criteria as part of their safety case assessment.

The MAH control rules must define what constitutes a safety management system and demonstrate how its key requirements are being met.

Implementing these reforms and measures will be critical to achieving process safety excellence. Process safety excellence is a key differentiator to gaining competitive advantage in global markets as it can lead to consistently high quality and reliable supplies. It can also restore public confidence in safety governance and encourage collaboration and partnership with local communities on industrial and spatial safety planning.

The MAH Rules prescribe a three-yearly cycle for continuous improvement and mandatory review of the safety report. However, should a major incident occur at the MAH unit, or should there be a major industrial accident, the safety report should immediately be reviewed and reassessed. For example, after the Buncefield (in the UK) and BP Texas Refinery incidents (both in 2005), tank terminals and refineries in India should have reviewed their safety report and provided assurance to regulators that sufficient control measures are in place.

At present, safety audits are primarily focused on occupational safety and health issues and lack sufficient technical rigour. The audit scope and methodology should be expanded to include auditing of major incident event scenarios and controls identified and assessed for each scenario. The audits should seek evidence on performance assurance of safety controls.

At present, safety audits are being conducted either by consultants or by safety auditing cell experts. Increasingly, this capability must be internalised within the inspectorate to ensure independence and to avoid potential business bias and rent seeking. External expertise can still be made available to the industry as support services.

Investigative and technical rigour should be enhanced in the inspections that are being undertaken by the inspectorate. There should be a national capacity building programme for inspectors in process safety, incident investigation, and auditing and inspections. Universities and professional institutions should contribute to the long-term skill development of inspectorates. The Directorate General, Factory Advisory Service and Labour Institutes (DGFASLI) should be strengthened and effectively utilised for developing professional capabilities of inspectorates. The Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE-UK), the International Labour Institute (ILI) and other international institutions should be invited to participate and contribute alongside Indian institutions.

Current accident fatality numbers are clearly not acceptable if India wants to become a global leader in this sector.

To achieve drastic reductions in the frequency and number of major accidents, India should transform its safety regulatory system and build professional capacities within the inspectorate. As a side benefit, this will also enable its strong and vibrant chemical and petrochemical industry to become world class, both in market and safety performance.

The writer is a safety specialist based in Perth, Australia