Iran's dangerous nuclear game

The recent visit by an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team to Iran has failed to resolve the controversy over the Islamic Republic's nuclear programme. Iran has remained legally within the ambit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which it has signed and ratified.

But there is considerable concern that it has pursued a nuclear programme that seeks to bring it within striking distance of going in for a nuclear weapon if it so decides. This poses a growing challenge to security in the region.

The key components of a weapons programme are firstly the availability of weapons grade fissile material (either Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239) in adequate quantities; a working warhead design (usually based on implosion); and a credible delivery system. In all three areas, Iran has made steady progress, while ostensibly remaining within the limits of the NPT.

Fordow plant

In the area of fissile material, Iran has set up centrifuge uranium enrichment chains, including the controversial plant at Fordow located deep underground (to protect it against air attacks).

While enrichment to 3-5 per cent Uranium 235 is legitimate for nuclear power reactors, Iran has gone much further and started large-scale enrichment to 20 per cent, ostensibly for fuel for its research reactor to produce useful isotopes for peaceful purposes.

However, the NPT and the IAEA safeguards regime require that all such facilities be subjected to inspections and careful accounting undertaken for all fissile and nuclear materials.

If the 20 per cent enriched Uranium is indeed required for research reactor fuel, then it should be processed into fuel rods and a reasonable fuel inventory established.

The capacity at Fordow is far more than necessary for one research reactor. Any large unaccounted accumulation of 20 per cent enriched Uranium would give rise to suspicions that this could be rapidly further enriched to weapons grade uranium (over 80 per cent U-235; enough for one bomb per 6 months) for possible weapons use.

Israel's might

In comparison, Israel's nuclear capability is much greater. It has around 200 nuclear warheads including sophisticated thermonuclear and miniaturised warheads. It has missiles such as Jericho III (range 5,000-11,000 km, payload 1 tonne) capable of reaching even the US. Israel is not a party to the NPT like India and Pakistan, and follows a policy of not openly declaring its nuclear capability.

Israel regards the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by any other State in the region as a threat to its security. It has not hesitated to strike at nuclear facilities in nearby Iraq and Syria, though it has been unable to counter Pakistan's nuclear capability.

The case of Iran falls somewhere in between, and there is intense debate in Israel over the feasibility of a military option, even though some Iranian leaders have called for the elimination of Israel. There is justified international concern that Iran is keeping open the option of breaking away from the NPT regime (which requires three months' notice) and going in for nuclear weapons.

If this is so, then attention must be devoted to the circumstances that might lead the Iranian leadership to take this extreme step. Such a step could only be taken in the face of a direct existential threat to the Islamic Republic. A military strike against Iran, from Israel or the West, would most likely compel Iran to go nuclear.

Internal politics

A country's external policy is deeply influenced by internal politics — 90 per cent of Iran's 79 million population belong to the Ithnasharya (Twelvers) sect of Shia Islam, the largest such concentration in the world. Iran is going through a legislative election, in which a large component of society representing reformist opinion feels excluded.

Within the conservative camp, there is a tussle for supremacy involving the aging 72-year-old Khamenei, the Supreme Leader and those close to President Ahmedinejad. The latter has been accused in major corruption scandals.

Within Iran, the Revolutionary Guards (widely interpreting their constitutional role of “protecting the Islamic revolution) have emerged as a State within a State, enlarging their influence in social, political and economic activities and amassing riches and power. Like the ISI in Pakistan, or the military in Turkey, the IRGC has built up its empire with hardly any systemic constraint. With a presidential election looming in 2013, no influential conservative leader in Iran can be seen as being soft on the West or Israel.

Internal political currents are visible in Israel and the US which is facing a presidential election. A recent poll showed 64 per cent of Israelis were now in favour of a nuclear weapons free zone in West Asia . The US has so far resisted Israeli pressures to go in for a military option.

What seems likely is further intensification of economic and financial sanctions against Iran, and covert operations to cripple its nuclear programme. In fact the sanctions have already had a severe negative impact on the Iranian economy. The market value of the riyal dropped by 50 per cent in January. Further impact is likely later this year when the EU's sanctions kick in.

Growing inflation and unemployment, together with political alienation of the moderates and reformers, may encourage opposition forces. This may induce the regime to reassess its nuclear policy, and come to the conclusion that it may be better to reach agreement with the IAEA.

The recent example of North Korea is a lesson that sanctions and persistent diplomatic pressure can achieve better results than force.

(The author is a former Ambassador of India and has been a member of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board)