Endgame in Afpak or descent into chaos?

The US roadmap on Afghanistan may run aground, if the experience initiated by the leader of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in the late eighties is any indication.

On June 22, 2011, President Barack Obama announced that the US intended to end all combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, while transferring responsibility for security to Afghan forces. This process is in place and the bulk of security operations even now are undertaken by Afghan forces, with American logistical backing.

The American strategy also involves a process of “reconciliation” through talks in Qatar between the Taliban, on the one hand and the Afghan High Peace Council, on the other.

Taliban and its ISI backers may not settle for anything short of substantial control in the initial years, over the bulk of Southern Afghanistan. The US is expected to retain a residual military presence of around 8,000 troops in Afghanistan, together with control of around half a dozen military airports, while focusing on training and counter-terrorism operations.

There is scepticism about the will of the US, to stay the course on its Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan to “combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security and territorial integrity”.

Gorbachev’S WITHDRAWAL

Interestingly, like Obama, Mikhail Gorbachev commenced withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1988. Gorbachev’s entire strategy was based on the naïve belief that Pakistan will cease arming the Peshawar-based Afghan Mujahedeen, in accordance with its commitments in the Geneva Accords. (In the preceding years, the CIA funded and provided the ISI with weapons, enabling them to arm and equip an estimated 80,000 fighters to challenge the writ of the regime of President Mohammed Najibullah).

Pakistan’s President General Zia-ul-Haq, however, made it clear that he had no intention of abiding by the Geneva Accords. He told and he would deny Soviet accusations of the ISI arming the Afghan Mujahedeen, telling President Reagan: “We will deny any arms aid is going through our territory. After all, that is what we have been saying for the past 8 years”.

Gorbachev made an ill-advised and desperate attempt to negotiate with the Peshawar-based, ISI-backed Seven Party Alliance of Fundamentalist Afghan Parties.

The Mujahedeen just stalled for time as they obtained ever more direct Pakistani military assistance to oust the Najibullah Government, which, interestingly, offered fierce resistance, till the Soviet Union collapsed in December 2011 and arms supplies dried up.

President Zia stated: “We have earned the right to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan. We took risks as a frontline State, and won’t permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real Islamic State, part of a pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims of the Soviet Union, you will see it”.

Is Obama’s “end game” in Afghanistan and his faith in “reconciliation” with the Taliban set to prolong the agony of the Afghans?

Afghanistan is, and will likely remain, an international basket case, for at least a decade. It will need at least $4.1 billion annually to maintain its armed forces.

The economy can become self-sustaining only if the country’s mineral wealth can be put to use, which will require at least a decade of conditions conducive to economic development.

The only redeeming feature is that the US, unlike the Soviet Union, will not collapse. Moreover, there is some recognition in the International Community that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will lead to the Afpak Region remaining the epicentre of global terrorism.

Much is going to depend on how domestic developments within Afghanistan play out and on the credibility of its Government. It is crucial to ensure that the forthcoming Presidential elections in 2014 are transparent, fair and credible.

NEW DELHI’S BLUNDER

It would of course be ideal if India can work with others to try and see that the leading Presidential candidate enjoys genuine domestic and international credibility and respect. President Karzai could then assume the role of an elder statesman.

Given the ideological inclinations of the Zia era officers, who now run the Pakistan army, it is going to be a difficult task to persuade and pressurise the military establishment to discard Zia’s grandiose notions of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and the Islamic world.

New Delhi will be making a serious mistake if it allows misplaced concerns about Pakistani “sensitivities” to inhibit its political and economic partnership, or its defence relationship, including arms supplies, with the dispensation in Kabul.

India has compromised its interests by seeking to appease Chinese “sensitivities” in the conduct its relations with the US, Japan, Vietnam and other ASEAN members.

Such undue concern for Pakistani “sensitivities” in Afghanistan will have serious security implications for India.