After the turmoil across the country and in both Houses of Parliament regarding corruption throughout 2011, one was hoping that the country and its leaders would be able to return to addressing the serious internal and external problems, and reach a consensus on key legislative issues of national governance.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
A political controversy, however, has suddenly arisen on an issue of national security, on which there should usually have been at least consensus, if not total unity. The 26/11 terrorist attack exposed glaring shortcomings in our intelligence and internal security structures. During the past few years, the Home Minister, Mr P. Chidambaram, has sought to address these shortcomings that existed throughout the tenure of his impeccably attired predecessor.
Seeking to coordinate and amalgamate the information available to all intelligence agencies, the Home Ministry came up with the idea of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which would act as a nodal point for coordinating, analysing and disseminating relevant information to the rest of the Central Agencies and to designated authorities in State Governments. The decision to establish the NCTC was formally conveyed to State Governments on February 1, 2012.
The Union Government has set up the NCTC under the Provisions of Section 2(C) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. The work of the NCTC will be supervised directly by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (DIB). The NCTC will have, under the Provisions of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, the powers for investigation, interrogation, arrest, detention and prosecution of those it charges with terrorism-related offences. It is also empowered to set up Inter-State teams where terrorist cells are located across State boundaries.
When State Governments studied the powers assigned to the NCTC, more than a dozen State Chief Ministers went ballistic, claiming that the Home Ministry's notification on the NCTC violated the basic federal structure of the Constitution, and undermined their constitutional authority on the maintenance of law and order. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa alone drew pointed attention to the issue that an intelligence organisation being vested with such sweeping powers was undesirable, in any democratic polity.
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
An eminent expert on global terrorism, Mr B. Raman, has noted that the concept of having a single agency for intelligence, investigation, arrest and prosecution was the brainchild of Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin. Stalin's brainchild, the KGB, was responsible for the arrest, detention, disappearance and execution of thousands of innocent Russians during his rule. Moreover, as a matter of principle, it is unwise to concentrate wide-ranging powers in the hands of a single intelligence agency, whose actions aren't subject to rigorous Parliamentary scrutiny.
This isn't to suggest that the IB in India has any propensity for indulging in extra-constitutional acts. The IB is an organisation which is respected by its peers internationally. Nevertheless, institutional checks and balances remain crucial for democratic governance.
Following the terrorist strikes of 9/11, the Americans introduced a number of changes to make inter-agency cooperation and coordination more effective. One of the measures undertaken was the establishment of a National Counter Terrorism Centre to provide better coordination between intelligence and investigative agencies. But the American NCTC has no powers to investigate crimes, or arrest and prosecute terrorists. This power remains with the FBI, which, like the CBI, is an investigative agency.
Similarly, the UK Counter Terrorism Command was created in 2006 by merging the anti-terrorism branch and the special branch of the Metropolitan Police. This Command has the powers for investigation, search and arrest. The MI 5, which is the British equivalent of the IB, doesn't have powers of arrest, or prosecution. New Delhi should bear this in mind while refashioning the role of the NCTC.
FOREIGN POLICY
This year hasn't started well even in the conduct of foreign policy. Uncertainty and faulty assessments of developments in the Maldives led us to initially label, what in reality was a coup, as a constitutional transfer of power.
And not surprisingly, busybodies like the British jumped into the fray, offering advice to the Maldivians, on what they should do. India has to make sure there is no Islamist takeover of the Maldives. Surely, all this should have been anticipated, and a destroyer positioned alongside Male to give substance to the messages being conveyed by our diplomats.
But all this pales in comparison with the looming crisis in our relations with Bangladesh. Two major agreements on the Demarcation of the Land Boundary and the sharing of the waters of the Teesta River remain unimplemented, because of opposition within India.
It is obvious that whatever consultations the Government may have held with the West Bengal Chief Minister Ms Mamata Banerjee weren't considered adequate, unlike those held by Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram on the Farakka issue with then Chief Minister Siddhartha Shankar Ray in April 1977, or the subsequent negotiations for the final Farakka Accord in 1997, in which Mr Jyoti Basu was actively involved.
It will be a major foreign policy disaster if New Delhi doesn't get the West Bengal Chief Minister and the National Opposition Leadership on board in handling both the river waters and boundary demarcation issues.
We will be letting down a Bangladesh Prime Minister who had placed her faith in us. It would pave the way for a return of rampant anti-Indian rhetoric and Islamist tendencies in the polity of Bangladesh.
(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)