The need to restore and further strengthen the autonomy of the country’s public institutions is emerging as perhaps the most critical issue in policy discourse during the run-up to the general elections. But the issue is not likely to figure prominently in election campaigning. Hence, we will be electing a new government without knowing where the leading political parties stand on the key issue. Worse, the election campaign will also not yield a gameplan for the task at hand on institutional reforms.

This is not all. The issue is complex and even those familiar with public policy debates will have to be mindful of the nuances. This is best illustrated by what economist and former RBI governor Bimal Jalan has had to say on the subject.

“The RBI is accountable to the government for executing the monetary policy that has been announced,” Jalan told the media earlier this month. But if there are differences of views between the autonomous institution and the government, then “the government should take a larger view depending on what the political situation is, what is actually happening on the ground.” To make things abundantly clear, he added, “the autonomous institution has to deliver the services that the government has approved as part of policy framework.”

But over the last weekend Jalan told an audience, “All government organisations should have policy implementation autonomy and, most importantly, they should be accountable to (the) people, and not the government.” He further explained, “The Centre and the State governments frame policies, but when it is about implementation, the accountability should be to the people of the country.”

Govt vs institutions

So we have clarity that the government frames policy and autonomous institutions implement it. But what if there is a dispute over whether the institution is doing the job right? Who is the final arbiter? Is it the government or the people? An aggrieved institution has no means of taking its case to the people but the government of the day can, by going to the people in an election. But the problem is that elections are fought on emotive issues like jobs, prices, farmers’ distress and not on abstract concerns like institutional autonomy.

This dilemma is best brought out by recent developments at the RBI and CBI. The government, not happy with the way the RBI was doing its job (say, implementing policy), told its chief so, but was not getting the right response. When tension between the two reached a peak the RBI Governor resigned. The government has now appointed a retired bureaucrat to head the RBI, who is familiar with the workings of the government. Where does this leave functional autonomy?

Now take the case of the CBI. There was an unseemly fracas between the number one and number two (both with the right political credentials) with allegations of corruption flying around. So the government removed both and brought in another incumbent. But the problem was that there was a well-laid-out procedure for choosing the number one. So he was temporarily reinstated. This proves that no amount of institutional safeguards can protect the autonomy of institutions if the players in question do not have their heart in the right place.

As opposed to this, take a look at how things are done in Britain. The prime minister or cabinet or individual ministers lays down policy and the civil service implements it. But the difference is that there the system seems to work. The independent civil service remains within its given policy briefs and ministers do not try to run the government on a day-to-day basis.

But conflict between the government and institutions is common in mature democracies. In the US, the director of the premier investing agency, FBI, was recently sacked by the US President. Hence we have both a successful model (Britain) where a self-effacing civil service is able to do its job well and also a fractious model (the US) where heads of institutions have a higher public profile and live more dangerously. India has its share of successful autonomous institutions like the EC and the CAG. So the key issue is how did the country get it right in these cases and wrong in the cases of the RBI and the CBI. The answer may lie in the history of individual institutions. Key leaders have played a role.

An autonomous institution needs to begin with an enabling framework. Thereafter, good leaders and governments which respect the autonomy of the institution allow good traditions to grow. Ultimately, it is these right traditions nurtured by all over the years which must be the most durable.

The writer is an independent journalist