How to stay ahead of terrorists

The recent terrorist attack on the air force station Pathankot focuses attention on why the terrorists were not apprehended despite appropriate advance warning intelligence. Also, why were the army’s para-commandos not deployed for the operation along with the Indian Air Force Garud commandos?

The para-commandos stationed under the Udhampur-based Northern Command in the vicinity of AFS Pathankot could have been tasked for the operation.

The role of the Border Security Force is to ensure security against illegal entry by anti-national elements into Indian territory; that of the Punjab Police is to apprehend them after they enter the country. Ideally, the Intelligence agencies are the first line of defence against externally fostered internal security threats.

The next line of defence is the BSF, followed by the Punjab Police; the AFS Pathankot security detail becomes the last line of defence. The role of the IAF is confined to the security of its station and how to tackle the threat after intruders have breached their station.

AFS Pathankot like any other IAF operational station has a ‘domestic area’ which houses the families and the Kendriya Vidyalaya which the terrorists partially breached although they did not succeed in taking hostages. The ‘technical area’ is where the fighter aircraft, missiles and ammunition are stored — the terrorists did not enter this area; they were neutralised in the domestic area. While the technical area has high security, the domestic area has lower security levels. Also, the airfield perimeter security poses a major challenge given the large acreage, besides flora. In this case, the terrorists reportedly trespassed through the airfield perimeter security wall which is guarded by watch towers manned by Defence Security Corps (DSC) sentries.

The DSC sentries, who bore the brunt of the attack, are expected to only perform routine duties that revolve around access control; they are not at all trained to operate like a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team. In addition to the DSC sentries, the IAF Police also manage access control of an operational base such as AFS Pathankot.

Besides, the IAF Police has a canine security component to strengthen its patrol capabilities in certain sensitive airfields. To that extent, the IAF’s operational stations such as AFS Pathankot have adequate security manpower.

To ensure its security objectives, the IAF raised its own commando force, “Garud, which was effectively deployed in the operation. The Garud commando force was raised in 2003 precisely for airfield security and allied tasks, apart from providing aid to civil adminstration. The rationale to raise the Garud force was that the IAF would not need to rely on the army for manpower to protect their assets, especially on UN missions overseas.

While the Garud force is trained on almost similar lines as the army’s para-commandos, they are not yet blooded for battle. This was perhaps the first time that Garud commandos participated in an anti-terrorist operation of such magnitude. It is for this reason that the navy’s marine commandos do a tour of duty with the army in Jammu & Kashmir to obtain the necessary battle inoculation through counter-insurgency operations. Otherwise, the Garud force participates in anti-Naxal operations. It’s role is limited to protecting IAF helicopters and aircrew from assault while on ground or just getting airborne. The Garuds, therefore, need to work more closely with the army in counter-insurgency operations to become a confident and credible combat unit.

Had the para-commandos been deployed, they would have approached the operation with unorthodox tactics characterised by speed, stealth and surprise. They may even have successfully taken a live prisoner, like Ajmal Kasab was taken after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Moreover, para-commandos are knowledgeable about the lay of the land and could have effectively engaged the terrorists along with the Garud force. Instead of the army’s regular infantry columns deployed for the operation, the para-commandos or special forces would have proved a better bet.

The rationale behind deploying the National Security Guards (NSG) was to avoid collateral damage considering the domestic area of AFS Pathankot was under attack. For instance, if the terrorists had entered the built-up areas and taken hostages, then the NSG would have proven useful. In the event that the terrorists successfully took hostages, they may even have attempted to somehow enter the technical area. The NSG is a security commando force that is best used for anti-terrorist operations related to hostage situations such as in the 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai or the Akshardham temple in Gujarat.

Even in the 26/11 terrorist attack, the chief minister of Maharastra should have rushed the Indian Navy’s marine commandos immediately till the NSG arrived on the scene. The marine commandos are closest stationed — at Panvel — and could easily have been flown across by IN helicopters into the Taj Mahal hotel. It is another matter that they were brought into the operation a little later.

The only way to thwart terrorism is through effective inter-agency channels between the various security agencies, both civil and military, which belong either to the State government or the Central government. Coordination between the IAF’s Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) and the Intelligence Bureau alone is inadequate without stronger participation by the State police services for better national security management.

The writer is an associate professor and teaches international relations and strategic studies at Christ University, Bengaluru