Those who are worried regarding the leakage of privileged communication between the Army Chief and the Prime Minister should feel relieved that, unlike in the rest of the globe, the current spat isn't a struggle to overthrow the elected government. This is merely regarding decision-making within the defence structure, as at present. The somewhat precarious position in the stocks of arms and ammunition must be well-known already to the Minister and officials, and also to parliamentarians attached to committees on defence.
UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE
In a constitution which gives importance to civil authority, the Army often thinks it isn't getting what it wants in terms of equipment, service conditions, pensions etc, simply because the generalist civilians don't listen to them. The perception is that the latter stymies the Army's proposals, citing reasons of geopolitics, diplomacy, parliamentary oversight, corruption antecedents, comparisons with civilian cadres, financial constraints, and so on. The generalist bureaucrats in the ministry are wary of the Army, and are afraid of being bamboozled by the mumbo jumbo of techno-military jargon. Can't we do something to mitigate this mutual distrust by integrating the overlapping functions of the Ministry and the Army HQs? It is possible, provided the political leadership isn't so irresolute, as it is now. The fate of the proposal to create a Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, to get a unified command structure, post Kargil, is a glaring example.
Again, it is a fact that the red tape within the army itself is formidable. Files on procurement get tossed from directorate to directorate, in addition to time spent on preparations of position papers and presentations to the top brass. Beginning from spelling out the specifications i.e., GSQR (General Staff Qualitative Requirements), selection of equipment, contractual actions, conduct of user trials etc, are handled by different directorates rather desultorily. Can this lead time be reduced? Reportedly, the Army is revamping some of these functions to reduce the internal lead time. The Army also needs to introspect and improve.
MAKE OR BUY
Another challenge is to take a call on “make” or “buy”. Even if the Army top brass makes speeches on self-reliance and self-sufficiency, their hearts are elsewhere. Their tenures are short, and they would rather opt for what they see as a fail-safe purchase process. However, the ministry has a high stake in developing and producing indigenously, as it signifies proud nationalism, symbolising technological advancement. Here, the attitude of the Army should be to cooperate wholeheartedly in indigenous efforts. It is often a fallacy to think that the “buy” route is easier and quicker. In the case of big ticket purchases, the baton passes from Sena Bhavan to South Block, and often loses its way. The Ministry of Defence (MOD), under the watch of the present minister, in its efforts to avoid getting tainted, seems to be fine-tuning procurement processes forever, and banning all dealings even with companies which alone have the right equipment on offer.
To develop and produce indigenously, the main hurdles are the volume and the timeframe. Our Defence R&D and production agencies, despite six decades of existence, don't seem to give that kind of confidence. Low volumes mean bad economics, and no private sector will be interested. MOD is also unable to take quick calls on JVs, FDI and Offsets etc, which would act as a stimulus in strengthening the technology and manufacturing base, giving, eventually, the kind of confidence the military requires. Instead of going after who leaked the information, the MOD will do well to attend diligently to quickening the process of policy planning and decision-making.