As elections are held in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India's largest state, attention has been drawn again to the question of whether the numbers and boundaries of India's states ought to be reconsidered. UP's incumbent leader Mayawati went to the polls, calling for the division of the state into four parts. Of all federal systems globally, India (along with Pakistan) has the fewest number of states or federal sub-units per capita. India's States are also of vastly uneven size and population.
For example, UP's population is 328 times larger than that of the smallest state, Sikkim. By comparison, there is a ratio of 66 to 1 between California and Wyoming in the US, or 91 to 1 between Brazil's largest state, Sao Paulo, and its smallest, Roraima. The average population of an Indian state, 37.7 million, is the population that exists in the largest state in the US.
THREE STATE PRINCIPLES
In India, where States are represented in the Upper House on the basis of population rather than on an equal basis as in Brazil or the US, the unequal size of States doesn't threaten the democratic principle of “one person, one vote” by overvaluing the vote of people in low population states. The continuing freeze on the distribution of Parliamentary seats between States in the Lok Sabha does, however, intentionally discriminate against voters in states with faster growing populations. However, simply creating new States without reallocating or increasing the total number of Parliamentary seats across States to reflect patterns of population change wouldn't significantly challenge these imbalances. Debates on resizing India's States or increasing their number, therefore, aren't typically concerned today with the question of representation at the federal level, nor do they cause significant concern on whether the “Union” can hold together in the face of multiple regional demands.
Debates on the number of States and their boundaries have instead clustered around three main principles. The first can be described as a cultural principle, whereby States are demanded or created to recognise distinct cultural or ethnic communities. The second principle is an administrative one in which the number and size of States should be dictated by concerns regarding the quality of administration; striking a balance between providing access to public services, and achieving economies of scale in their provision. The third principle that has been more vigorously asserted in the context of economic liberalisation is that creating more, smaller States can act as a driver of further economic growth by spurring sub-national competition and policy innovation, or help to address regional inequality. The fact that Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand (two of India's three newest states, each created in November 2000) — and Bihar (the “parent state” left when the third state of Jharkhand was created) — saw some of the highest rates of economic growth among all Indian states in the 2000s, despite being among the poorest, has increased interest in this third argument.
CREATION OF NEW STATES
In the 1950s and 1960s, language was the major organising principle for state reorganisation. The States created in north-east India from the 1960s onward enshrine different forms of recognition and protection for local “indigenous” communities. In recent decades, the practice of state creation hasn't closely followed any one of these principles. The three new states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand were created within the Hindi-speaking belt of north and central India in 2000 by a central government led by the Hindu nationalist BJP that had historically been opposed to a multicultural vision of Indian federalism. Since then, demands for Statehood have resurfaced strongly within India's first linguistic state — for the creation of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh — and elsewhere, bringing language into question as a rationale for organising territorial space.
MULTIPLE FORCES
Another interpretation for state creation, particularly in 2000, sees it as being led by a state acting at the behest of capital restless for new regions to exploit. Such a view reflects unease regarding the aggressive intensification of natural resource exploitation pursued by the new States of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand , and the plains-centric industrial policy of the supposedly “hill” state of Uttarakhand.
Yet, the creation of new States in recent decades has, in fact, reflected neither a straightforward logic drawn from the pressures of capital or claims to recognition. Their creation is not to be seen simply as another example of India's multicultural federalism in action, in which new States are created to provide better representation to territorially concentrated ethnic communities. By the time Statehood demands were conceded, wide pro-Statehood political coalitions had formed that went beyond particular ethnic groups or coalitions.
Furthermore, calls for “recognition” on a cultural basis didn't feature strongly in Statehood demands in Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand. In Chhattisgarh, there was no strong grassroots demand whatsoever for Statehood, although it had support among political elites.
Nor, despite their location at the heart of disputed trajectories of industrialisation and natural resource exploitation, are the newest States to be seen simply as the gift of a State acting on behalf of capital seeking to gain better access to their natural resources.
Such a view underplays the diversity of interests among industry, and their occasional uncertainty on state creation, given the potential for nativism associated with statehood demands.The latest process of State creation was a complex one with multiple causes that unfolded during a long time period. The timing of State creation reflected political conditions at the state and all-India levels, rather than the depth or intensity of mobilisation within individual regions. New States haven't necessarily bequeathed federal units with more cohesive regional political communities, where the rights of “local” populations are protected or privileged, or more business-friendly environments are guaranteed.
Indeed, pro-Statehood campaigns frequently, though temporarily, submerge the tensions between divergent groups, goals, and interests. The prospects for any future resizing also rest on shifting political coalitions, rather than a clear set of principles.
That Statehood demands can be raised and settled through the democratic process is a strength, even if it doesn't produce results that satisfy the proponents of Statehood.
(The author is Lecturer in Politics at the King’s India Institute, King’s College, London, and the author of ‘Remapping India: New States and their Political Origins’ .)
This article is by special arrangement with the Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.