The US and its anti-terrorism narrative

Former US president Barack Obama astounded audiences in New Delhi when he proclaimed that the US had no evidence of Pakistani government complicity in the prolonged stay of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad. Obama’s statement was particularly astonishing because bin Laden lived in a huge mansion with a large family barely a kilometre away from the Pakistan Military Academy. It is impossible for any foreigner to live even for a day in Abbotabad cantonment without the knowledge and approval of the Pakistani army.

Obama was fully aware of Pakistani complicity in providing bin Laden safe haven. He also turned a blind eye to Pakistani assistance to the Taliban, which resulted in the killing of over 2000 American soldiers. Obama firmly believed he needed Pakistani cooperation in arranging for an early withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, he was quite ready to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan at any cost and even consider a significant role for the Taliban in the future governance of Afghanistan.

It was for this reason that he readily agreed to a dialogue involving the US, Pakistan, the Afghan government and the Taliban. Denying Pakistan’s role in bin Laden’s stay was considered imperative to achieving this aim. Obama’s policies also involved the US and Pakistan treating the legitimate government of Afghanistan and the Taliban virtually as sovereign equals, while giving Pakistan a significant say in the future governance of Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s hand was also strengthened by support from Russia and China, who coordinated their efforts with Pakistan to equate the status of a recalcitrant Taliban and an isolated Afghan government. Taking note of Pakistan’s imperatives, China and Russia sought to create a new narrative, averring that the real threat of global terrorism came not from the Taliban, but from the Islamic State (ISIL), whose cadres, it was claimed, were shifting to Afghanistan. Iran, not surprisingly, was helped by Pakistan to establish contacts with Taliban leaders. Taliban supremo Mullah Mansour was killed in an American drone strike in Baluchistan while returning from Iran. This suited Pakistan just fine as it would help it to claim that the Tehriq-e-Taliban, which was fighting against it from Afghan soil, was really nothing but an ally of the ISIL. But, given public and Congressional opinion in the US, Obama could not achieve his cherished objective of bringing back American combat forces from Afghanistan while attempting to virtually hand over Afghanistan to Taliban/Pakistan control, despite having held office for eight years.

Pakistan’s ambitions received a setback with the unexpected election of Donald Trump. Trump had made it clear that he was not going to forget the loss of American lives, nor quietly withdraw from Afghanistan and hand it over to Pakistan-backed Taliban rule. He was determined to listen to his military advisers to make the Afghan military strong enough to resist Taliban depredations by providing it firepower and airpower. The US declined to join the Russia-China-Pakistan initiative to promote dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban while ignoring Taliban-sponsored terrorism.

Indian diplomacy persuaded the American establishment and Trump himself that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism had to be tackled not just across Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan, but also its borders with India. On June 27, the Modi-Trump Declaration proclaimed the will to meet threats from not just the al Qaeda, ISIS and Taliban, but also the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba ‘D (Dawood) Company’, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Naming the Hizb was a categorical American rejection of Pakistan’s claims that it was helping a “freedom struggle” in Jammu and Kashmir.

India should not relent on its campaign against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The US Congress had developed a bipartisan consensus to deny American assistance to Pakistan unless it ends its support for the Taliban and India-focused groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The US Congress had, in fact, also drafted legislation incorporating such conditions on aid to Pakistan. New Delhi was, therefore, surprised when the Trump administration moved legislation to delink aid to Pakistan from its support for India-focused terrorist groups. The focus was entirely on Pakistan support for terrorism in Afghanistan. The White House, however, condemned the release of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed on November 25 stating: “If Pakistan does not take action to lawfully detain Saeed and charge him for his crimes, its inaction will have repercussions for bilateral relations and for Pakistan’s global reputation.”

It is clear that while the Trump administration is determined to strengthen the Afghan armed forces adequately to deal with Pakistan support for the Taliban, it will have to be reminded continuously that India looks forward to its abiding by its word during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington and act against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism across South Asia. While the White House staff and large sections of the Pentagon deeply distrust Pakistan, there are sections of the State Department and “liberals’ in the American think tanks and mainstream “liberal media” which have historically resorted to India-bashing. It is, therefore, crucial that India strengthens the bipartisan consensus in the US Congress to condition aid to Pakistan on its ending terrorism not just in Afghanistan, but across the entire South Asian region.

It should also be made clear to Washington that our participation in the US, Japan, Australia, India ‘Quad’ cannot be confined just to the security of sea lanes in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Washington should also deal firmly with issues of terrorism across the Indian Ocean. Trump’s visits to Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam and the Philippines clearly established that the US needs partners if it is to get the Chinese to respect international conventions and treaties, in the Indo-Pacific Region. The Quad partnership, however, cannot be selectively confined to issues of US interest alone. Trump could well consider diluting his emphasis on strong action against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in his Afghanistan policies also while yielding to his domestic “compulsions”.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan