Senior officials of around 160 countries are meeting in Geneva on October 23-24 to prepare the ground for a WTO ministerial meeting, scheduled to be held in February 2024 (MC13) in Abu Dhabi. What are some of the key issues that are likely to be discussed in the senior officers meeting (SOM)? How do the interests of the various countries stack up? What could be the implications of the outcome for many developing countries, including India? Let us examine these questions in respect of a few key areas.

In agriculture, at the last WTO ministerial conference (MC12), held in June 2022, the issue of negotiating a permanent solution to the problem of public stockholding for food security purposes did not find a mention in the outcome documents.

At the SOM, India can be expected to revive this issue and push hard for some meaningful progress on its long-standing demand on it by MC13. However, India is likely to encounter stiff opposition from some of the agriculture exporting countries. Further, it would have to grapple with the US’ attempt to seek market access for its exports of GM food — in the name of promoting food security.

Fisheries subsidies

The SOM will witness a lively discussion on the ongoing negotiations on fisheries subsidies, an unfinished task at MC12. The current negotiating text does little to discipline countries with large industrial fishing fleets, and instead seeks to curtail the ability of developing countries to nurture their nascent fisheries sector through subsidies.

It provides a huge loophole to the developed countries, particularly the European Union, for continuing with their subsidies, ostensibly on the grounds that these promote sustainable fishing.

These subsidies are being contested by a large number of developing countries, including India and Indonesia.

The developing countries are likely to seek outcomes that will provide them some policy space to subsidise fishing within their exclusive economic zone. There also appears to be a strong under-current to prevent China from riding on the back of the developing countries for subsidising its fishing sector.

Turning to the judicial arm of the WTO, the SOM is expected to provide some guidance on having a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all Members by 2024. Over the past 7-8 months, informal negotiations have been held on this issue.

However, these are being conducted in considerable secrecy among a handful of countries.

The US is in no mood to revive the Appellate Body, the second tier of the dispute settlement mechanism. The intention of the US and some other developed countries is barely concealed — weaken the dispute settlement mechanism and leverage the resulting power-based system for shielding their illegal unilateral trade measures.

The following task is cut-out for India and other developing countries: ensure that reformed dispute settlement system is effective in upholding the rule of law at the WTO and holds all countries, including the developed countries, accountable for their trade actions.

At the SOM, the developing countries also need to press for a more transparent and inclusive multilateral negotiating process on this issue. They must not let the US continue to drive the informal negotiations from the back seat.

Perhaps the most acrimonious debate is likely to centre around reforming the WTO. Over the past few months, the developed countries have led many proposals that would tilt the institutional architecture of the WTO further against the interests of most developing countries. Given the far-reaching implications of the reform proposals, it is relevant to discuss three illustrations.

First, under the guise of deliberating on emerging global challenges, members could discuss issues outside the ambit of the agreements at the WTO without an endorsement by the membership — as required by the existing rules. This would clear the path for initiating negotiations on issues of particular interest to the developed countries.

Second, some of the proposals would result in providing a formal role to the private sector in WTO processes. This would legitimise the ability of large corporates to influence the outcomes at the WTO, and also allow some players to undermine nationally determined positions of their government by having a second strike at the WTO.

Third, some of the proposals would require convening more informal sessions to provide the forum for extended and more free-flowing conversations on trade issues. This proposal would inject more opaqueness in a system that is fairly non-transparent even today. It would enhance the functions and power of the WTO Secretariat, which would play a decisive role in finalising the topics for convening informal meetings, its agenda, and the speakers. Further, as there may not be any formal minutes of the proceedings, it is uncertain whether the Secretariat would be objective in its reporting about the meeting and its outcome. These factors would render the informal meetings as an instrument for promoting the interests of a handful of powerful countries.

The agenda

During the SOM what should be India and other developing countries’ agenda? Reviving the Appellate Body with some modifications, striving for a permanent solution to the problem of food security, negotiating effective subsidy disciplines on industrial fishing, securing the right to impose customs duties on electronic transmissions, extending the Covid-19 TRIPS decision to pharmaceuticals and diagnostics, reiterating the primacy of decision-making by consensus and instituting rules for more transparency in the organisation of WTO ministerial meetings and during the preceding process in Geneva readily suggest themselves.

In addition, WTO reform must address the asymmetries and imbalances in existing WTO agreements and also provide policy space to developing countries to pursue catch-up industrial policies.

In conclusion, developing countries must recognise that the outcomes at the SOM would set the template and roadmap for MC13. They must not be led astray by developed countries’ narratives, and instead should examine the technical details of various issues. They must put proposals on the table to promote their development imperatives.

They must not hesitate in raising issues concerning the worrying conduct of the DG WTO, who seems to have discarded the veneer of neutrality and is openly supporting initiatives that do not have the backing of the entire WTO membership.

The writer is an expert on WTO and international trade. Views expressed are personal