For the West, Libyan Dictator Muammar Gaddafi's death implied the extraction of a decades-old thorn that oftentimes set off politically septicaemic troubles for the US and its allies in Europe. On the face of it, his elimination is only part of a larger game-plan.
Leveraging the pro-reform turmoil in the Arab realm, the West managed to surgically eliminate Gaddafi as part of a not-so-secret strategy to rid the region of opponents and further consolidate its already strong hold on the region. The next in the crosshairs will have to be Syria's autocratic President Bashar al-Assad.
Al-Assad is already under tremendous pressure from the Arab League and within sections of his country to introduce political reforms or quit.
The US and its allies in Europe have imposed sanctions on oil trade with Syria, the main revenue-earner for the beleaguered government. The US and Europe have frozen Bashar al-Assad's accounts in their countries.
Since the elimination of Gaddafi, tensions have spiralled in Syria. The al-Assad government has unleashed the military on pro-democracy protesters in the provinces of Homs and Hama, in a new cycle of action and recrimination that mayeventually propel the government to self-destruct.
According to the UN, since the start of protests in March, at least 3,000 people have been killed in the unrest. The Syrian government has blamed the violence on armed fighters aided by foreign countries who, it says, have killed 1,100 security personnel.
While the Syrian National Council, a coalition of opposition groups, has opted for peaceful protests, the shadowy Free Syrian Army, made up largely of military deserters, has asked for a Libya-type intervention by the US and Europe.
CLOSING IN ON SYRIA
Undoubtedly, the pincer is closing in on Syria. For the West, al-Assad's exit is the next step to the eventual control of West Asia and North Africa.
The Shia axis in the region, anti-US and virulently anti-Israel, has for long been the stumbling block for US and Western interests.
The axis, represented by Iran and the al-Assad government in Syria, both Shia-ruled, has among other things fuelled Lebanon's Shia-dominated Hizballah and supported the Palestinian fighters led by Hamas.
In the aftermath of Iraq's invasion in 2003, the US government indicated that Libya was the next target. Realising Washington meant business, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi capitulated swiftly and submitted himself to the West, abandoned his nuclear programme and allowed Western oil companies to do business.
STALEMATE IN IRAN
The US then turned on Iran, raking up the nuclear issue. Though the Bush administration brought international pressure on Tehran to go slow on its nuclear agenda, it didn't make much headway as far as regime change was concerned.
Pro-reform, pro-West sections in Iran organised mass protests, albeit unsuccessfully. In the elections that followed in 2005, not only did the pro-reform contender Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani lose, but a hardline leader, Mohammad Ahmedinejad, came to power.
Unwilling to countenance this, the Bush administration indicated it was contemplating use of force against Iran. But, by then, Iraq had turned into a quagmire and the US government realised it was in no position to stretch itself militarily over Iran. Tehran responded pragmatically to US pressures on the nuclear issue, giving in tactically to defuse any possible action that may have been planned against it. A stalemate followed. And then, earlier this year, Tunisia and Egypt happened. It wasn't a coincidence that the protesters in Tunis and Cairo had a pro-Western tilt and aimed for a liberal democratic state.
The US government and its European allies, after appearing to hesitate, threw their weight behind the pro-reform protests in a calculated move that has since paid them enormous dividends.
REMOVING AL-ASSAD
Given that the Western-educated al-Assad is very different from Gaddafi, both as an individual and the style of politics he practises, the process of al-Assad's removal may be different from that in Libya. From al-Assad's rigid reaction to the revolt in his country so far, it looks like he will meet an end similar to Tunisia's President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali or Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. For al-Assad, it is a Hobson's choice: either reform and perish, or resist and perish. If al-Assad brings in democratic reforms, encourages genuine opposition and free elections are held, it will naturally pave the way for a government chosen by the people.
There is no guarantee that al-Assad will win. If the Syrian President resists and uses force on his people, the denouement is predictable: sanctions, limited military action with support from the West and a violent takeover.
Once al-Assad's wicket is down, it will pave the way for the US and its allies in Europe to focus on their biggest challenge in the region: to neutralise Iran. This will mean supplanting the Islamist state with a secular democracy — a.k.a. pro-West government.
But Iran isn't a family-run dictatorship that can be brought to its knees by eliminating a patriarch. The theocratic state is a functioning democracy, albeit an Islamist version. Besides, it enjoys sizeable popular support. Undoubtedly, there is a large pro-West pro-reform section but that hasn't made much headway despite several attempts.
But with al-Assad out of the way, a consequently weakened Hizballah in Lebanon and the Hamas pinned down in Gaza, Iran will be in danger of isolation.
The US and its allies will get their best opportunity yet to eject the Islamist leadership from power. Whether Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ahmedinejad and their supporters will be able to withstand the combined might of the West is bound to resemble a sharp-edged political thriller that may have yet another twist to the tale.
(The author is an independent journalist and formerly Editor of Al-Jazeera based in Doha.)