The next general election will soon be upon us. Over a billion voters will elect 543 members of the Lok Sabha. That’s 1.8 million voters per MP. Contrast this with the first Lok Sabha. 170 million voters elected 489 MPs. That’s 3.4 lakh voters per MP.

So for many years now I have had a bee in my bonnet. This is that there should be two MPs per constituency because of two reasons.

One, the number of people in each constituency is now a huge multiple of what it was in 1952 when the first general election was held.

Two, if the winner gets even half the votes — usually it’s enough to get a third — it means half the people in the constituency could go unrepresented.

My submission is that at least 70 per cent of the people in a constituency must feel represented. That’s possible only if you have two MPs per constituency.

The main argument against this is that regardless of where you are in the world — except the dictatorships of course — an MP usually represents only about half the people in his constituency. The other half have to await their turn. But that’s exactly my point.

Why should half the people go unrepresented? To say that’s how it is everywhere is not a good argument.

Vote share

The European parliament has proportional representation, as does the German one. The share of MPs in parliament is equal to the vote share in the election. But that too is an aggregate measure and doesn’t solve the individual constituency representation problem.

Another argument against is that coalitions take care of the representation problem. But I have two objections to this.

One, coalitions are formed after, not before, an election. Two, they are between one or more parties which leaves the representation problem unresolved. If I as a voter think the MP from my constituency is no good, whom can I complain to?

Then there is the ‘winner takes all’ problem. Given how much money is spent on development in the constituencies, there is an inbuilt incentive now to maintain the representational monopoly. This has led to all kinds of financial shenanigans.

My case can be framed in an intellectual framework, too. This has to do with what economists call convexity which, at its simplest, means combinations.

When faced with choices — bananas and oranges, say — they say don’t choose one of the other, always choose a combination because that’s more likely to maximise your utility than just one fruit.

But this is the opposite of what religion tells us. Choose one, please, no combinations. Politics says the same thing. Parties talk about inclusion while actually practising exclusion.

The question is if political choice should also be non-convex for a constituency. Logically speaking, no. There’s no reason at all except convention and tradition. There are no practical problems, either. All that’s needed is to make the runner-up also an MP.

And this can be done without prejudice to the ‘senior’ MP. It’s like a public good where the marginal cost of electing the second MP is zero and he or she doesn’t reduce the first MP’s status, privileges and powers. Imagine Amethi in this context. Or any other. Wouldn’t the people there be better off?

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