Winds of change in June

There are two ways of trying to understand the June 2024 general election results: figuring out the meaning of the verdict, or the reasons for the BJP’s underwhelming performance; and its consequences for the new government. In the absence of sufficient information, it is hard to pinpoint the broader forces that have dragged the BJP below the majority mark.

But some surmises can be made: a sense of hubris; a feeling that a huge majority for the BJP could lead to the Constitution being fundamentally changed, taking away quotas for the dalits and OBCs; dissatisfaction over inflation and unemployment; a reaction to the promotion of personality cult using State resources; the perception regarding use of State power to browbeat political opponents; an attempt to steamroller regional parties; and maybe, an overdose of religious messaging and innuendo.

It will take some time to figure out which forces were at work, and in what measure.

But the results per se tell us a few things. First, the BJP’s loss has been the Congress’ gain. Congress had fared poorly in a straight contest against the BJP in the last two general elections. Therefore, the performance of the Congress this time should bolster its confidence in upcoming Assembly elections in Maharashtra and Haryana.

Regional assertion

Second, the regional parties have held their own against the BJP juggernaut, with the exception of the Biju Janata Dal, whose loss in both the general and Assembly polls seems to be a straightforward case of anti-incumbency.

The election, characterised by the good show by DMK, Telugu Desam, NCP-Sharad Pawar, Shiv Sena (Uddhav Thackeray), Trinamool Congress and Samajwadi Party, marks a pushback against a homogenising force. Many of these parties came into being in the 1980s and 1990s to counter the centralising, anti-democratic tendencies of the Congress party at that time. Now, the wheel has come full circle, with the BJP being perceived in a somewhat similar way to the Congress of yesteryear — as a threat to regional forces.

In contrast to the BJP under Atal Behari Vajpayee, there are more regional parties against the BJP today than those with it. It is worth asking whether the BJP central leadership has paid a price for being too pushy and meddlesome with its erstwhile alliance partners.

This regionalist pushback marks a federal assertion against central policies, which should make the BJP strategists wonder whether its slogan of ‘double-engine ki sarkar’ in Assembly elections has been well received. To many, it would seem like the Centre trying to be the boss.

This pushback seems pronounced in Maharashtra, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. The BJP brought the Maharashtra debacle upon itself by doing an ‘Operation Kamal’ there — bringing down the Maha Vikas Agadi government and triggering a split in the Nationalist Congress Party and Shiv Sena. Its alliance partners in Eknath Shinde and Ajit Pawar became liabilities for the BJP, whereas Uddhav Thackeray benefited politically from his clumsy ouster.

The reasons for TMC surpassing its 2019 performance could be State-specific. Tamil Nadu’s result could be influenced by familiar socio-cultural undercurrents.

The BJP has also benefited in certain States due to local factors. It has reaped the benefits of anti-incumbency in Odisha. Its ally, Telugu Desam, has done the same in Andhra Pradesh. It should be a cause of some satisfaction to the BJP, and perhaps even the Congress, that Aam Aadmi Party, has not fared well in Delhi and Punjab.

The Congress might have nearly doubled its tally, but its performance in Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh and to an extent Telangana, where it is in power, should be a cause for concern — just as it can derive some satisfaction from its results in Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

The mood shift in India’s biggest State, Uttar Pradesh, will be a subject of discussion for sometime.

The BJP will have some introspection to do on what went wrong. A quiet churn within the party cannot be ruled out.

A coalition government is a certainty. This is likely to balance Centre-State power. Its effects on policymaking are likely to be positive.

Decisions will be marked by more deliberation and negotiation. India’s post-1990 experience with coalition governments has been quite positive. The virtues of ‘absolute majority’ are certainly overblown, as coalitions bring with them their own checks and balances, so essential in a democracy.

A return to sober governance, sans over-the-top ideological messaging and hyper-narratives, is perhaps what the people really want and need.